Introduction
I have been studying safety in healthcare settings since the 1990s, predominantly in acute care settings and at a national policy level. There is a growing sense of unease about the way we do safety in healthcare today and in retrospect there are some fundamental things that many would have done differently. Despite efforts by many committed and well-intentioned policy makers, managers, clinicians, researchers and patient groupsimprovements in safety have been confined to just a few notable examples. 1 Thankfully the way we think about safety is changing. There are three concepts in particular that anyone working in safety should study in order to rethink and reframe the way we do safety in healthcare; complex adaptive systems, the three models of safety and safety II. Let's first look at complexity and complex adaptive systems.
Complex adaptive systems
Complexity science has evolved in part from systems theory and aims to help us understand what constitutes a complex system (and complex adaptive system) and to identify the common characteristics. Complexity scientists aim to study the properties and characteristics of the entire system; the dynamics, the independent and interdependent relationships that make up the system, and the emergent behaviours of the system. Complexity science is considered an increasingly useful conceptual framework for understanding how healthcare is delivered, how people within it can be supported and how it can be optimised.
Knowing the difference between simple, complicated and complex is important because they all require different skills, different resources and responses. Too often we try to simplify a complex problem and seek the simple solution. We try to implement solutions that are inappropriate for the degree of complexity. Top down interventions that are designed for complicated systems and imposed on complex ones will not make a difference to the everyday reality. This is in part why it is so difficult to engage some staff in quality improvement projects or to disengage them when the projects do not seem to work. In this respect it is also really hard to convert policy into action. A complex system rarely responds to full scale change preferring incremental rather than transformative approaches. Designing a flow chart that would work beautifully for a complicated task would for a complex problem only end in frustration.
Accidents and incidents come in many sizes, shapes and forms and it is therefore naı¨ve to hope that one model or one type of explanation will be universally applicable. Some incidents are really simple and some are really complex so different models are required. The current models and methods require that systems are linear with resultant outcomes. In fact healthcare is far from a linear system, and outcomes are emergent rather than resultant. The typical features of a complex healthcare system are random acts, changing context and conditions. Complexity models attempt to move us away from the naivety of conventional linear or straight line thinking and causality, i.e. 'if we do x it will inevitable result in Y' or 'z happened because of x followed by y followed'.
Healthcare is considered a complex adaptive system. Common characteristics are those of emergence and non-linear dynamics; the systems can move from, or include different areas of stability to very unstable behaviour. The study of healthcare as a complex adaptive system has been considered for at least two decades. 2 
Plsek and Greenhalgh wrote in 2001:
• The science of complex adaptive systems provides important concepts and tools for responding to the challenges of health care in the 21st century.
• Clinical practice, organisation, information management, research, education, and professional development are interdependent and built around multiple self-adjusting and interacting systems.
• In complex systems, unpredictability and paradox are ever present, and some things will remain unknowable.
• New conceptual frameworks that incorporate a dynamic, emergent, creative, and intuitive view of the world must replace traditional "reduce and resolve" approaches to clinical care and service organisation.
Complexity science forces us to consider the dynamic and non-dynamic properties of healthcare and the varying characteristics, forces, variables and influences across it. This includes understanding the flow across and within different sections of the system from general practice, to ambulance services and emergency departments and beyond. This is needed in order to help people to operate successfully within a constantly changing and unpredictable environment.
Therefore, if we want to change or improve or strengthen a complex system like healthcare we need to look for patterns in the behaviour of the system. We need to look for interconnections within the system rather than isolated problems. In safety, this means looking at the things that occur in relation to lots of incidents and not simply the incidents in isolation. Importantly, we need to be careful when attributing cause and effect in a complex adaptive system, as we have seen it is very rarely that simple.
Equally we should be careful about prediction
Prediction can never be certain -things happen when you least expect them to in healthcare. Therefore, keep in mind the system is dynamic, and it does not necessarily respond to intended change as predicted. Healthcare is changing all of the time and cannot be pulled apart in the same way. Its behaviour is also momentary so even if there is an attempt to understand it at one time or one point it will have changed before that understanding has been explained. We owe it to people who work in the frontline of healthcare to better understand how to work in a complex adaptive system.
Three models of safety
The second concept we need to study is the 'three models of safety' by Charles Vincent and Rene Amalberti. 3 With synergies to complexity science, the authors recognise that some areas of healthcare are predictable and certain, some areas are 'normally' unpredictable and uncertain. Vincent and Amalberti clearly articulate the need to recognise that strategies for managing safety in highly standardised and controlled environments such as radiotherapy need to be necessarily different from those in which clinicians and others constantly have to adapt and respond to the changing circumstances they are faced such as the emergency department of a general practice in the community.
They describe how healthcare attempts to function effectively with all these differing environments and responds by providing care and clinical treatment that is tailored for specific patient needs. Their three models help us to think differently about risk and safety and the strategies needed to improve both:
1. Ultra adaptive -Embracing risk -Taking risks is the essence of the profession. The model required is that of experts who rely on personal resilience, personal expertise and technology to survive and prosper in the adverse conditions. 2. High Reliability -Managing risk -Risk is not sought out but is inherent in the profession. The model required is that of the devolved groups who can organise themselves, provide mutual support, and who are allowed to adapt and make sense of their environment. 3. Ultra safe -Avoiding risk -Risk is excluded as far as possible. The model lends itself to regulation and supervision of the system to avoid exposing frontline staff and patients to unnecessary risk
Safety I and safety II
The third concept we need to consider is that of safety II. Erik Hollnagel describes two contrasting views on safety; the reduction of harm through the study of failure (coined as safety I) and the study of how people and systems are able to succeed under variations so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible (coined as safety II). 4 Hollnagel argues that the same behaviours and decisions that produce good care can also produce poor care. The same decisions that lead to success can also lead to failure. Behaviours or actions that can lead to making an error or mistake are variations of the same actions that produce success. It is only with the benefit of hindsight can we see that some of the decisions led to failure and some to success; however, we only study those that led to failure.
Our work in healthcare safety to date has been to focus on the outliers of the system (where it does not work such as incidents and where it succeeds and is considered excellent) and attempt to manage that system by addressing the outliers that are deemed to have failed and using the solutions from the outliers that are deemed to succeed. Rather than looking at either or both tails of a normal distribution of outcomes, we should look at the broad area in the middle, at the things that happen frequently or always, in the daily activities of the everyday clinical work that just functions and unfolds regularly as it should. 5 In life we pay more attention to the negative things. Consequently, negativity is considered more impactful that positivity. This attitude has 'infected' the world of safety. We constantly feel we have to change healthcare processes, systems, practices based on the negative things that happen rather than the positive.
Hollnagel's view is that patient safety is more than the absence of risk or incidents but more the ability to perform in a resilient manner. The only way it can do that is to study how health systems work and not just how they fail. His view is that the prevailing approach (safety I) ignores the subtleties of everyday work and ignores the reasons why it almost always goes right despite the obstacles and difficulties. Safety I ignores the adaptations and adjustments that actually enable frontline people to get stuff done.
One of the crucial things we need to understand is that safety II does not replace safety I.
Like many things in life the answer is in a balance of the two, an integration of the different thinking rather than the false binaries. Safety II is safety I and safety II thinking -the two are bought together. It is not about dismissing the past or rejecting the safety I approach. The lack of progress to date is due to how safety I models have been used and applied rather than the models themselves. We need to keep the practices that continue to work but abandon or at the very least address the approaches, methods and tools that have been now proven to be false, myths or fallacies.
Studying the every day
The three concepts described provide those that work in safety with a way to start looking at safety from a set of different perspectives. All of them argue that in order to improve safety or create safety what we need to do in healthcare is take a close look at the work as it takes place in everyday situations and in all the different situations. Not the work that people think should be done, not the work that people will tell you about, but the actual way in which people work including the things they may do that are not conventional or according to policy or considered the right thing to do. To help this we need to understand the different ways in which people may describe the 'work'; the terms work-as-imagined, work-as-done, work-asprescribed and work-as-imagined.
The things that happen frequently in the daily activities of every day clinical work are termed work-asdone. Work-as-done consists of adaptations and adjustments by healthcare practitioners in order to keep people safe. Healthcare workers at the frontline of healthcare adapt and adjust their actions and decisions according to the patients they are caring for, the conditions they work in and situations they face. The combination of which are rarely if ever the same. However, conventionally we assume that people will work as they are supposed to and may not even explore how they actually work. This is the difference between work-as-done and work-as-imagined.
The term work-as-imagined refers to the way people who regulate, inspect, and design interventions don't really understand what reality is actually like. The distinction between the two is often used to point out that there may be a considerable difference between what people are assumed or expected to do and what they actually do. The policy makers, regulators and others believe they know what happens or should happen and if there is a difference between this opinion the people involved are accused of non-compliance, violations or performance deviation.
Work-as-prescribed is when we set clear rules and detailed instructions for carrying out tasks. Some forms of prescribed work become defunct but are still officially in place. Some forms of prescribed work have drifted into mythology with people convinced that they are expected to work in a certain way which has in fact never been prescribed. Just because it is common sense, it does not mean it is common practice.
If people who are responsible for developing guidelines or standards or policies and procedures are relying on what they imagine someone does rather than what the frontline workers actually do then the policy could turn out to be unworkable, incomplete or fundamentally wrong. And in respect to safety solutions, if the designers don't understand, consult and engage the frontline then they can develop the wrong solutions that won't work. If they think they have come up with something that 'will solve the problems at the frontline' and those who are at the frontline are left with the feeling that 'this doesn't solve our problems', it feels clumsy. The incongruence makes it hard for frontline staff to implement things they are being told to do resulting in frustration and workarounds. The unintended consequence of this is that it triggers a degree of initiative fatigue or fatigue in relation to initiatives that seem misaligned with the goals of their day to day work creating a chasm between the leadership and frontline of organisations. When we fix the wrong thing for the wrong reason, the same problems continue to surface. It is costly and demoralising. 6 In the three models of safety, Vincent and Amalberti assert that there are some specialties such as radiotherapy, chemotherapy, medication administration (the ultra-safe) when the gap between work-as-done and work-as-prescribed needs to be as narrow as it could be possible. This is where it is vital that the prescribed practice matches reality and is constantly reviewed to ensure that it remains so. However, most work-as-done in ultra-adaptive healthcare is impossible to prescribe exactly. Work-as-done in these areas is a combination of experience, expertise, clinical judgement and knowhow. Not everything we do in ultra-adaptive environments can be written down in detail. In this case, the guidance is more likely to work if it is written in general terms rather than the fine detail which may not quite fit with reality. It is important to ensure that the guidance is constantly reviewed to ensure that it is still up to date and also still workable.
Work-as-disclosed is how people describe what they do either in writing or when we talk to each other. However, this may not always be what is actually done. For many reasons, it may be the partial truth. This may be because: (1) explaining every little detail would be too tedious, (2) we do things automatically and we may forget some of the details when we come to explain it, (3) we may tailor it to the audience and when we come to explain it we do it too simply, and (4) we say what we want people to hear.
Work-as-disclosed is a particular issue for healthcare. In a culture of fear and when we are being scrutinised, we may 'just tell people what should happen not what does happen' or 'simply tell people what we think they want to hear'. In addition, work as disclosed may be different for different people involved in the same incident. People often do not report workarounds and conceal the actual practices they do to keep patients safe. Staff confronted with ever increasing imposed demands are frantically resorting to workarounds just to survive a shift. In that respect those designing safety interventions may think that the interventions are working when they are not because no one is disclosing that they are not. This means that interventions continue to be churned out which then lead to more and more workarounds. Ironically as the number of workarounds increase, the organisation becomes more and more complex.
Conclusion
The world we live and work in is complex so the notion of a single approach to patient safety must be rejected.
The emerging concepts in relation to safety have captured the imagination of people who work in safety in healthcare. This is in part because of the overwhelming feeling that if we keep doing the same things in safety, we will not be making the difference we all want. There is also a huge desire to shift from the relentless focus on the negative and the things that have gone wrong. These three concepts provide us with a different lens for which to look at how the safety of patient care could be improved. It is time to look beyond patient safety and to share these new approaches in order to push the margins about what we think about safety.
In doing so, we should study aspects of sociology, anthropology, psychology, communication, conversations and behavioral insights, together with the latest safety theory; just culture, resilience engineering, organizational safety and safety II. It is time to get beneath the surface of our current superficial approach to safety and create a truly balanced and significantly more nuanced approach to safety. 7 
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